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Abstract: Phased mission analysis is carried out to predict the reliability of systems which
undergo a series of phases, each with differing requirements for success, with the mission
objective being achieved only on the successful completion of all phases. Many systems from
a range of industries experience such missions. The methods used for phased mission
analysis are dependent upon the repairability of the system during the phases. If the system
is non-repairable, fault-tree-based methods offer an efficient solution. For repairable systems,
Markov approaches can be used.
This paper is concerned with the analysis of non-repairable systems. When the
phased mission failure causes are represented using fault trees, it is shown that the binary
decision diagram (BDD) method of analysis offers advantages in the solution process.
A new way in which BDD models can be efficiently developed for phased mission analysis
is proposed. The paper presents a methodology by which the phased mission models can
be developed and analysed to produce the phase failure modes and the phase failure
likelihoods.
Keywords: phased mission analysis, fault tree analysis, binary decision diagrams, non-
repairable systems
1 INTRODUCTION
Many systems undergo phased missions when per-
forming the functions for which they are designed.
A phased mission is one where the overall mission
can be split into a number of phases, performed in
sequence, in which the objectives change from one
phase to the next. The mission is successfully com-
pleted if all phases are successfully accomplished.
For example an aircraft flight could be considered
as a mission with phases: taxiing to the runway,
take-off, ascend to the correct altitude, cruise, des-
cend, land, and taxi back to the terminal. Each phase
uses differing functional elements of the system
and so the causes of failure in each phase will be
different.
In such circumstances, mission reliability can-
not be determined by studying the individual phases
of the mission in isolation, for two reasons.
1. The phase failure probabilities are not statisti-
cally independent. Some components or subsys-
tems influence the success, or failure, of more
than one phase.
2. It cannot be assumed that all components are
functioning at the start of each phase, even if
they can be assumed functional at the start of
the mission. In the example of an aircraft flight,
if the landing gear fails following take-off during
the ascend, cruise, or descend phases, it will
remain that way until the landing phase, when
the mission will fail. Failures can remain unre-
vealed in some phases and mission failure will
occur not when the failure events happen but
on the point of transfer from one phase to
another.
The methods for conducting systems reliability
assessments for phased missions utilize different
techniques depending on whether the system can
*Corresponding author: Department of Aeronautical and
Automotive Engineering, University of Loughborough, Lough-
borough, Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK. email: J.D.Andrews@
lboro.ac.uk
JRR27  IMechE 2006 Proc. IMechE Vol. 220 Part O: J. Risk and Reliability
93
be repaired or not. For systems which are non-
repairable throughout the duration of the mission,
such as an aircraft flight, fault tree methods offer
the most efficient solution. Esary and Ziehms [1]
used fault trees to represent the failure conditions
for each mission phase which can be combined
and, with the use of a minimal cut set reduction
method, evaluated to obtain the mission unreliabil-
ity. A component’s failure during each phase of the
mission was considered as a separate event. This sig-
nificantly increases the size of the problem for analy-
sis. Zang et al. [2] extended the fault-tree-based
method to utilize binary decision diagrams (BDDs)
as a more effective representation of the phase
failure logic for efficient analysis.
By considering the failure of each phase individu-
ally, the problem complexity can be reduced [3].
The conditions for a failure in any specified phase
occur when all previous phases have completed suc-
cessfully, and then either the failure conditions
occur, causing in-phase failure, or the failure condi-
tions already exist when the phase is entered, caus-
ing phase transition failure. This approach again
employs BDDs and develops a new event algebra to
account for the non-independence of the compo-
nent failure events from one phase to the next. In
addition to the overall mission unreliability, the
method also yields the phase unreliabilities, which
can be used in risk studies where the consequences
of failure differ from phase to phase. (For example,
consider the consequences of failure in the taxiing
phase or the cruise phase of an aircraft flight.)
Where components can fail and be repaired
during the mission, Markov methods are used to
calculate the mission failure probability [4–6].
The research reported in this paper develops
an efficient, systematic generation of the mission
BDD for phased missions. While using a single
model to represent the conditions for mission fail-
ure, as with the method of La Band and Andrews
[3], the phase failure probabilities can also be
deduced.
2 BINARY DECISION DIAGRAMS
BDDs offer an alternative approach to fault trees to
represent a system’s failure logic. Their structure
enables the system failure probability to be deduced
efficiently and without resort to any approximations.
However, they are difficult to construct directly from
the system definition and are generally obtained by
converting from a fault tree.
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph with all paths
starting at the top root vertex and terminating in
one of two terminal vertices, 1 or 0. A terminal 1 ver-
tex indicates top event occurrence, and a terminal 0
vertex indicates top event non-occurrence. The dia-
gram consists of terminal and non-terminal vertices
connected by branches; the non-terminal vertices
correspond to basic events. Each non-terminal ver-
tex has two branches leaving it, a 1 branch and a 0
branch, which indicate occurrence and non-occur-
rence respectively of the basic event. The construc-
tion of the BDD requires the basic events to be
ordered. In Fig. 1 an example of a BDD is shown: it
represents the logic function A.B þ B.C with the
ordering A < B < C assumed (note that the symbol
þ represents logical OR, and the symbol . repre-
sents logical AND).
A
B B
C1 0
1 0
0
1 0
1 0 1 0
1 0
Root Vertex
Terminal 0 vertex
Non-terminal vertex
Fig. 1 BDD
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Paths through the BDD indicate the component
conditions which determine the system state as
given by the terminal node. So, in the BDD shown
in Fig. 1, if A fails and B fails, a terminal 1 node is
reached, which means that, under these conditions,
system failure occurs (i.e. this specifies a cut set).
3 BINARY DECISION DIAGRAM
CONSTRUCTION
The conventional rules used for constructing BDDs
from fault trees have been covered extensively in
previous papers [7, 8] and will therefore only be
summarized here. From the structure of the BDD
shown in Fig. 1 it can be seen that each intermediate
node can be represented as an if–then–else (ite)
triple of the form
iteðX , f1, f2Þ ð1Þ
where X is a Boolean variable, f1 is a logic function
to consider if X is true (on the 1 branch) and f2 is
a logic function to consider if X is false (on the
0 branch). When combining two logic functions
expressed in this way, the rules are as follows: if
h ¼ iteðX ,h1,h2Þ and k ¼ iteðY , k1, k2Þ are two logic
functions, then
h k ¼ iteðX ,h1  k1,h2  k2Þ, X ¼ Y
iteðX ,h1  k,h2  kÞ, X < Y

ð2Þ
where  represents the AND/OR logic operator.
The method used for constructing the BDDs in
this paper is one whereby the BDDs for each phase
in the mission can be constructed separately and
then combined to form the mission BDD. It is
accomplished by noting the structures which result
when inputs for each gate type are combined.
For example, consider the BDDs representing the
logic expressions A þ B þ C and A.B.C shown in
Figs 2(a) and (b) respectively, where the ordering
A < B < C has been assumed.
For an OR gate the BDD structure forms a chain
where the basic events are linked by their 0
branches. The AND gate BDD structure has the basic
events linked on their 1 branches. This concept can
also be extended to combining logical expressions
which are inputs to fault tree gates. For example,
if h and k are logic expressions which are inputs
to an OR gate, then the BDD representing the
combined logical expression can be obtained by
replacing the terminal 0 vertices in the BDD repre-
senting the first logical expression by the BDD repre-
senting the second logical expression. For inputs to
an AND gate, each terminal 1 vertex is replaced by
the second BDD. Once the combined BDD is
formed, prior to simplification, it is possible that
the ordering assigned to the basic event variables
will be destroyed and some variables may appear
more than once on paths from the root vertex to
the terminal nodes. Care must then be taken to
deal with repeated variables on the same path. If by
combining BDDs there is now, in the new BDD, a
variable which also appears earlier in the structure,
this repeated variable can be removed. The first
occurrence of the variable is the one which fixes
its state. So, if on some path a variable is first
passed through on its 1 branch, this fixes that the
component is in its failed state on this path. For the
second occurrence, the node is omitted and replaced
with a link directly to the node on its 1 branch; every-
thing below its 0 branch is deleted. If the path first
passes the basic event on its 0 branch, the com-
ponent failure has not occurred on this path, the
second occurrence of the node is replaced by a
A
B
C
1
1
1 0
A
B
C
1 0
0
0
1 0
1 0
1 0 1 0
1 0
1 0
(a) (b)
Fig. 2 BDDs representing (a) A þ B þ C and (b) A.B.C
A binary decision diagram method 95
JRR27  IMechE 2006 Proc. IMechE Vol. 220 Part O: J. Risk and Reliability
direct link to the node on its 0 branch, and the
nodes connected to the 1 branch are deleted. The
following standard collapsing operations can also
be applied to obtain the most efficient BDD.
1. If the two sons of a node X are equivalent, then
delete node X and direct all its incoming edges
to its left son.
2. If nodes A and B are equivalent, then delete node
B and direct all its incoming edges to A.
A ‘son’ of a node is simply the node directly
attached to either its 1 or 0 branch. For example,
consider h ¼ A þ B.C and k ¼ C þ A.D; the BDDs
representing these functions are shown in Figs 3(a)
and (b), with the ordering A < B < C assumed in
the first BDD and C < A < D in the second.
To obtain the BDD representing h þ k, the BDD
representing k replaces the two terminal 0 vertices
in the BDD representing h. The resulting BDD is
shown in Fig. 4.
As can be seen, variables are repeated on paths,
e.g. both A and C are repeated on the same path.
Considering the path 0 branch of A, 1 branch of B,
and 0 branch of C takes us to the repeated variable
C. As this lies on the 0 branch of C, the repeated vari-
able can be removed and all that lies on its 0 branch
kept. This then leads to the repeated variable A;
as this lies on the 0 branch of the first occurrence
of A, the repeated variable can be removed and
all that lies on its 0 branch kept. This is just a term-
inal 0 vertex. The other repetition of A can be dealt
with in the same manner. The resulting BDD is
shown in Fig. 5(a). By identifying that the variable
B is irrelevant, the final, reduced BDD is shown in
Fig. 5(b).
This method of combining BDDs can be adopted
to model phased mission problems efficiently. The
methodology to do this will be developed and
demonstrated by considering a simple example.
4 PHASED MISSION EXAMPLE
A simple phased mission problem consisting of non-
repairable components A, B, C, and D (Fig. 6(a)),
will be considered here in order to demonstrate an
efficient method of BDD construction for phased
mission analysis.
A
B
C
1
0
1 0
C
A
D
1 0
0
1
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
(a) (b)
Fig. 3 BDDs representing (a) h and (b) k
A
B
C
1
1
C
A
D
1 0
0
1
C
A
D
1 0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
00
0
0
0
0
0
Fig. 4 BDD representing h þ k
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During phase 1, which lasts until time t1, the suc-
cess of the mission is dependent upon the fact
that component A and at least one of components B
and D functions. Successful completion of phase 1
means that the mission then enters phase 2, which
requires component B and at least one of components
A and C to function between times t1 and t2. Success-
ful completion of that phase then means that the sys-
tem enters phase 3, and so on. The mission is
successfully accomplished if all phases are completed
successfully.
The phase failure fault trees are given for this
mission in Fig. 6(b).
5 CONSTRUCTION OF PHASE BDDs
The first stage in the methodology is to convert all
the phase fault trees to their BDD form. Considering
phase 1, the top event, ‘failure in phase 1’ is given by
the logical expression A1 þ B1.D1, where the notation
Ai represents the failure of component A in phase i.
Assuming the ordering A1 < B1 < D1, and using the
rules that for the OR gate the events are linked by
their 0 branches and for an AND gate by their 1
branches, the BDD representing this expression is
shown in Fig. 7(a). In phased mission problems the
state of components which are used in subsequent
phases are important, as they have a bearing on the
future performance of the system. Hence, in the
BDDs representing each phase, paths ending in a
terminal 0 vertex, representing system functioning
through that phase, must consider all components
used in that and subsequent phases. Therefore the
BDD representing failure in phase 1, shown in Fig.
7(a), must be extended so that all component states
are defined on the paths ending in a terminal 0
vertex where the mission will pass to the next phase.
On the terminal 0 connected to node B1, the condi-
tions of A1 and B1 are specified (both work). This
needs to be expanded to include all states that
components C1 and D1 can reside in. For the second
terminal 0 (the 0 branch of the D1 node) the status
of A1, B1, and D1 is fixed. It only remains to con-
sider all states for C1. The extended BDD is shown
in Fig. 7(b).
The BDDs developed for failure of the other three
phases are illustrated in Fig. 8.
The ordering of basic events can be different for
each phase (as it is in this example) to obtain the
most efficient representation of the phase failure
logic.
6 CONSTRUCTION OF THE MISSION BDD
These BDDs representing failure on the separate
phases will now be used to construct a mission
BDD. The overall structure of the mission BDD is
shown in Fig. 9. There are now more than two sys-
tem outcomes identified, which means that this
new failure logic structure departs subtly from the
BDD. The end states represent either a failure in a
phase, labelled f1, f2, f3, or f4 for failure in the phase
indicated, or a mission success, labelled 0.
Once constructed, the BDD can then be subjected
to a reduction process to ensure that the component
state logic is consistent on any branch.
The resulting BDD can be reduced by use of the
following rules.
Rule 1. Ai: Aj ¼ 0, as a non-repairable component A
cannot fail in phase i and phase j.
Rule 2. Ai: Aj ¼ 0 for i < j, as a component cannot
be repaired once failed.
Rule 3. If K1 is a minimal cut set for phase j, and the
components which make up this cut set fail in
phases prior to j, then upon entering phase j the
system will fail.
A
C
1
1 0
1
1
0
01 0
B
C
1 0
1 0
A
C1
1 0
1
1
0
0
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5 Simplified BDD structure
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Ai represents the fact that component A functions
throughout phase i. The system example illustrated
in Fig. 6 is considered again to demonstrate the con-
struction process. The BDDs shown in Figs 7(b) and
8(a), representing failure in phases 1 and 2 can be
combined into a single BDD representing failure in
phases 1 or 2 by replacing the terminal 0 vertices in
the BDD in Fig. 7(b) with the BDD in Fig. 8(a). The
resulting BDD is shown in Fig. 10(a). This has been
reduced using the rules 1 to 3 above.
Apply rules 1 and 2 along the following paths:
1. along the 0 branch of A1, 0 branch of B1, 1 branch
of D1, 1 branch of C1, 0 branch of B2, and 1
branch of A2;
2. along the 0 branch of A1, 0 branch of B1, 0
branch of D1, 1 branch of C1, 0 branch of B2, and
1 branch of A2.
In both cases, remove node C2 and connect
directly to f2, as component C has already failed in
phase 1.
Similarly, apply rules 1 and 2 to the following
paths:
1. along the 0 branch of A1, 0 branch of B1, 1
branch of D1, 1 branch of C1, 0 branch of B2, and
0 branch of A2;
2. along the 0 branch of A1, 0 branch of B1, 1
branch of D1, 0 branch of C1, 0 branch of B2, 1
branch of A2, and 0 branch of C2;
3. along the 0 branch of A1, 0 branch of B1, 1 branch
of D1, 0 branch of C1, 0 branch of B2, 0 branch of
A2, and 1 branch of C2;
4. along the 0 branch of A1, 0 branch of B1, 1 branch
of D1, 0 branch of C1, 0 branch of B2, 0 branch of
A2, and 0 branch of C2.
This results in a terminal 0 vertex.
Applying rules 1 and 2 to the path, 0 branch of A1,
0 branch of B1, 0 branch of D1, 1 branch of C1,
0 branch of B2, and 0 branch of A2 removes C2.
Applying rule 3 to the path, 0 branch of A1, 1 branch
of B1, and 0 branch of D1 results in the terminal node
f2, as B is a single order minimal cut set for phase 2.
The resulting reduced BDD is shown in Fig. 10(b),
where the 1 and 0 labels on the branches leaving
each intermediate node have been omitted for
clarity. This BDD was then combined with the BDD
representing failure in phase 3 (the phase 3 BDD is
attached to the 0 branches of the combined phase
1 and 2 BDD) and reduced, using rules 1 to 3, to
obtain a single BDD representing failure in phase
1, 2, or 3. The resulting BDD has 47 outcomes of
which 31 are failures, two are failure in phase 1,
nine are failure in phase 2, and 20 are failure in
phase 3. Combining this BDD with the BDD repre-
senting failure in phase 4, (Fig. 8(c)), the BDD repre-
senting mission failure is obtained. This is shown in
Fig. 11, where the 1 and 0 labels on the branches
leaving each intermediate node have again been
A
D
B
B
A
C
B
C
D
A
C
Phase 1
(a)
(b)
Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
Failure in Phase 1
A
B D
Failure in Phase 2
B
A C
Failure in Phase 3
B
C D
Failure in Phase 4
A C
Fig. 6 (a) Reliability network of a simple phased mission system; (b) fault tree
representation of individual phase failures
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omitted for clarity. Each left edge leaving a variable
node is the ‘1 branch’ and each right edge the ‘0
branch’. In this case there are 47 failure outcomes;
two in phase 1, nine in phase 2, 20 in phase 3, and
16 in phase 4. This is equivalent to the results obtai-
ned using the cause consequence diagram method
for this problem [9]. This method of combining
the BDDs for the different phases can obviously
be applied to any phase mission problem for a non-
repairable system, but in order to demonstrate how
the method is applied has been shown here for the
particular example taken.
7 QUANTIFICATION
7.1 Phase failure modes
Each path through the mission BDD will termin-
ate in either a phase failure or the mission success.
The component status conditions encountered
along each path will specify over which phases the
components must work and which phase it is possi-
ble for the failure to occur in order to cause the spe-
cified system event. From the path conditions which
result in system failure in any phase the phase failure
modes can be determined. A phase failure mode is a
list of the necessary and sufficient conditions experi-
enced at component-level events (phases working
and phases where failure can occur), which lead to
the specified phase failure.
A1
1
B1
D1
1 0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
A1
1
B1
D1
1 C1
0 0
D1
C1
0 0
C1
0 0
1
1
1
1
10 0
0
0 1 0 1 0
0
(a)
(b)
Fig. 7 BDDs representing failure in phase 1
B2
A2
C2 C2
D2 D2 D2
1
1
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0
1 0 1 0
1
1
1
1
0
00
0
(a)
(b)
(c)
B3
C3
D3 A3
A3
1
1
0 0
0 0
1 0
1
1
1
1
0
00
0
A4
C4
1 0
0
1
1
0
0
Fig. 8 BDDs representing failure in (a) phase 2, (b) phase 3,
and (c) phase 4
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For systems with non-repairable components it
is possible to introduce a phase algebra to deter-
mine the phase failure modes. This algebra was
established in reference [3]; it will account for the
non-independence of component conditions from
one phase to the next, and enable the minimal con-
ditions required for phase failure to be established,
which will be used in the phase failure probability
calculations. It is only of interest in which phases
the component failure could occur to contribute
to the phase failure. When considering the disjoint
paths for phased mission systems with non-
repairable components, account must be taken of
the fact that, if a component fails in phase i, then it
must have worked through phases 1, . . ., i1. This is
expressed algebraically as
A1,i1:Ai ¼ Ai ð3Þ
where Aj,k represents the functioning of component
A from the start of phase j to the end of phase k.
Using rules 1 and 2 from the section on construc-
tion of the mission BDD with the condition
Ai:Ai ¼ Ai ð4Þ
the phase failure modes can be evaluated. This is
illustrated for the first two phases of the mission
BDD shown in Fig. 10(b). The disjoint paths leading
to failure in phase 1 are
A1
A1:B1:D1
ð5Þ
The initial disjoint paths leading to failure in phase 2
and their subsequent reduction to the phase failure
modes are
A1:B1:D1
A1:B1:D1:C1:B2 ! A1:D1:C1:B2
A1:B1:D1:C1:B2:A2 ! B12:D1:C1:A2
A1:B1:D1:C1:B2 ! A1:D1:C1:B2
A1:B1:D1:C1:B2:A2:C2 ! B12:D1:A2:C2
A1:B1:D1:C1:B2 ! A1:D1:C1:B2
A1:B1:D1:C1:B2:A2 ! B12:D1:C1:A2
A1:B1:D1:C1:B2 ! A1:D1:C1:B2
A1:B1:D1:C1:B2:A2:C2 ! B12:D1:A2:C2 ð6Þ
Phase failure modes for the other phases are eval-
uated in the same way; this produces 20 phase 3
failure modes and 16 phase 4 failure modes, which
are not listed here.
7.2 Phase and mission failure probability
Each path on a BDD through to a terminal fi vertex is
disjoint, and therefore the phase failure probability
can be obtained by summing the probabilities of
the disjoint paths. In order to find the mission failure
probability it is necessary to sum the probabilities of
all the disjoint paths ending in any terminal fi.
Using the method described in this paper, more
information can be gained than just mission failure
probability, as the BDD also gives the probability of
failure in each phase. This has an advantage over
other methods [1], which produce only the mission
failure probability.
The example phased mission used to illustrate the
method is considered again; qAi is used to represent
the failure probability of component A in phase i,
and Qi is taken to be the failure probability in phase
i. Then
qAi ¼
Zti
ti1
fAðtÞdt ð7Þ
where fAðtÞ is the failure density function for com-
ponent A in phase i, and phase i runs from ti1 to
ti. For phase 1
Q1 ¼ qA1 þ 1 qA1ð ÞqB1qD1 ð8Þ
For phase 2 then
Q2 ¼ 1qA1ð Þ 1qD1ð ÞqB1 þ 1qA1ð ÞqD1qC1qB2
þ 1qB1 qB2ð ÞqD1qC1qA2 þ 1qA1ð Þ 1qC1ð ÞqD1qB2
þ 1qB1 qB2ð ÞqD1qA2qC2 þ 1qA1ð Þ 1qD1ð ÞqC1qB2
þ 1qB1 qB2ð Þ 1qD1ð ÞqC1qA2
þ 1qA1ð Þ 1qD1ð Þ 1qC1ð ÞqB2
þ 1qB1 qB2ð Þ 1qD1ð ÞqA2qC2
f1
f2
f3
f4 0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
 
Phase 1
failure
Phase 2
failure
Phase 3
failure
Phase 4
failure
Fig. 9 BDD representing the mission
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Expressions can also be determined for Q3 and Q4
using the same method. The probability Qmisson
of the mission failure can then be determined
using
Qmission ¼
X
i
Qi ð9Þ
8 GENERAL ALGORITHM
8.1 Mission BDD construction
1. Utilizing constructs for AND and OR gates
produces the BDD for each phase from the
phase fault trees. These are expanded in com-
parison with usual BDDs, as all possible states
of components required in future stages must
be explicitly considered on the paths leading to
phase success.
2. By considering the mission failure as an OR
combination of the phase failures, a mission
BDD can be constructed. Terminal mission
BDD nodes denote the phase in which the mis-
sion fails or that mission success has been
achieved. Since it has more than two possible
outcomes, this mission BDD is subtly different
from a conventional BDD.
3. Phase failure BDDs are incorporated, one by
one, into the mission BDD to yield a structure
where mission states are determined by the per-
formance of the components in each phase.
4. The mission BDD is reduced to its simplest form
by removing paths which represent impossible
component conditions such as failing more
than once or working in phases which follow a
failure.
8.2 Mission BDD quantification
1. Failure modes for each phase of the mission are
obtained by considering the component condi-
tions represented along each of the BDD paths
leading to the specified phase failure.
2. The failure modes are simplified using the phase
algebra.
3. Component phase failure probabilities are eval-
uated.
4. Using the disjoint phase failure modes and the
component failure probabilities the phase failure
likelihoods are quantified.
5. The phase failure probabilities can be combined
with the consequences of phase failure in order
to perform a mission risk analysis, or summed
to yield the mission failure probability.
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Fig. 10 (b) Reduced BDD representing failure in phase 1 or phase 2
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9 CONCLUSIONS
1. The method given in this paper provides an
effective approach for developing the BDD for
a system which undergoes a phased mission.
This BDD will identify the causes of each phase
failure.
2. The phase failure modes can be identified from
the resulting mission BDD.
3. Using the disjoint nature of the phase failure
modes and the probability of component failures
in specified phases, the phase failure probability
for each phase can be obtained. This can be
combined with differing consequences of failure
in any phase to perform a mission risk analysis.
4. Mission failure probability is obtained by sum-
ming the phase failure likelihoods.
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